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In this paper the recent e⁄ect of the European Monetary Union on inward
FDI-￿ows is examined. We use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach and ￿xed
e⁄ects with common time controls. The estimated results of the latter ap-
proach show that the introduction of the Euro raises inward FDI by 17 percent
within the Euro-area and by 9 and 12 percent to and from non-member coun-
tries respectively. Moreover the geographical e⁄ects of the Euro are explored.
The results show partial agglomeration tendencies for the euro area. There
are also some indications of increased importance of vertical specialization in
the sample.
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11 Introduction
A large body of empirical literature on the e⁄ects of the European currency
union on trade is now forming, following the seminal paper by Rose (2000).
These include Bun and Klaasen (2002), Barr et al. (2003), Micco et al. (2003)
and Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003). Their results show that the European currency
union has increased trade volume with a magnitude ranging between 15 to 38
percent. Moreover, this trade increase has not been con￿ned to member states
only, but has extended also to non-member countries as well.
This paper will address an interrelated issue, namely the question of whether
the European currency union has had any e⁄ects on foreign direct investment
(FDI) ￿ ows. FDI ￿ ows can be considered to be an interrelated issue to trade
since, at least on a theoretical basis, it is often viewed as either a substitute
of trade (horizontal FDI) or a complement to trade (vertical FDI). In addi-
tion, it can give an indication of whether the EMU creates better conditions for
￿rms making long-term decisions for investment. One argument against ￿ oat-
ing currencies is that higher exchange rate variability creates uncertainty that
discourages international investment and trade. Fixing the exchange rate elim-
inates this risk, hence encouraging international investment and trade, as well
as making ￿rms cost calculations and pricing decisions easier. Adopting a single
currency is a very credible commitment to exchange rate stability and has the
advantage of reducing transaction costs that would otherwise occur, indepen-
dently of the aforementioned volatility channel. Both e⁄ects should promote
international investment, i.e. FDI ￿ ows.
In spite of the intuitive appeal of the argument that lower exchange rate
volatility will increase FDI ￿ows empirical evidence regarding the e⁄ects of
the European currency union on FDI ￿ ows is currently absent.1 The approach
of this paper is novel since little or no research, to my knowledge, has been
devoted to appraise the e⁄ects of the European currency union on FDI ￿ows.
On a broader perspective, the recent economic and policy debate, concerning
the economic e⁄ects of the European currency union on its member states, has
been based on an increasing amount of empirical evidence and this paper is an
attempt to investigate yet another aspect of this occurrence.
1A partial exception is Barr et al. (2003) that present stylized facts concerning european
FDI ￿ows.
2We use a new dataset on FDI ￿ ows, a panel of unilateral FDI ￿ ows is formed
between 18 developed countries for the years 1992 to 2001. Since we are trying
to ￿nd potential e⁄ects of an institutional reform, a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
and a ￿xed e⁄ects with e¢ cient common time controls approach, suitable for
identifying such structural changes, is used to gauge the e⁄ects of the EMU on
inward FDI. The results of this study show that the EMU increases inward FDI
￿ ows within the Euro area with approximately 17 percent and inward FDI to
and from non members with around 9 to 12 percent respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some styl-
ized facts and basic concepts concerning FDI are presented. Section 3 discusses
the data, and Section 4 considers the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents
the main results, whereas Section 6 deals with the robustness of these results.
Section 7 combines trade and FDI data in order to examine potential economic
geography e⁄ects of the euro. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Basic Concepts and Stylized Facts
A FDI is a cross-border investment made by an investor with the intent of
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another country.2 In
principle, when a ￿rm wishes to make sales abroad it has a variety of modes
that can be employed, such as export, license, agents or direct investment. FDI￿ s
are an alternative equivalent to producing directly in the country one wishes to
serve.
In latter years, FDI has become an increasingly important factor in the global
economic activity, with world FDI ￿ ows growth rates that, by far, exceeding
those of GDP or trade (Table 1), even though a huge drop has befallen world
FDI ￿ ows after the turn of the millennium.
Another interesting feature of the FDI ￿ ows is that they have been primarily
concentrated to developed economies (Table 2), receiving about 70 percent of
2According to Eurostat, who follow the OECD benchmark de￿nition of FDI (third edition),
an international investment is classed as FDI when an investor owns ten percent or more of
ordinary shares or voting rights in an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise abroad.
3world in￿ ows during the 90￿ s, and who, after several recent ￿nancial crises in
developing countries have increased their share to more than 80 percent.3
Table 1
Growth in FDI, Trade and GDP
Period growth rates %, world, current US$
1992-96 1996-2001 1992-2001 1992-2000
FDI, In￿ ows 78.7 70.5 154.7 236.4
Exports and Imports 34.6 14.2 48.9 52.6
GDP per capita 5.4 6.8 12.2 12.3
GDP PPP, current 0.2 0.22 0.42 0.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Table 2
FDI in￿ ows, share in total
High Income Middle Income Low Income SSA￿
In￿ ows In￿ ows In￿ ows In￿ ows
92-95 90.40 3.83 0.23 0.01
96-98 94.61 25.02 0.35 0.02
99-01 84.47 10.51 0.06 0.04
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
￿Abbreviation for Sub Saharan Africa
The existence of FDI has several major explanations. One type is market
oriented, where FDI gives companies access to foreign markets thus acting as
a substitutes for trade, so called horizontal FDI. Another rationale for FDI
is production oriented and driven by cost minimizing incentives, where global
companies gain strategic advantage by shifting low paid jobs abroad while keep-
ing high value added research at home thereby producing parts, or the entire
￿nal product, in low-cost areas, so called vertical FDI. Finaly a third rationale
implies that the mode of outsourcing depends on the market structure. The dis-
tinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is a theoretical construct,4 where
a horizontal FDI is said to solely sell its products in the foreign market, while a
vertical serves the home market. It is a construct insofar that no FDI acts solely
3With the majority of FDI in￿ows, 40 percent, to developing countries going to China.
The developed countries share of world out￿ows is of course even higher, ranging between 85
to 95 percent. See Markusen 2002, Ch. 1.
4See Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2003).
4as either and the debate of whether most FDI act as if they were horizontal or
vertical is not settled.
From a theoretical perspective the avant-garde literature on FDI focuses
on two main areas. The ￿rst focuses on explaining the rationale behind the
existence and the consequences of multinational activity within a general equi-
librium framework. This consists, mainly, of attempts to incorporate FDI into
the new trade theory of economic geography and the models focus primarily on
real factors of production. Questions concerning capital ￿ ows, i.e. the ￿nancing
decisions of the ￿rms are believed to be largely separable from the decisions
regarding location of production and the direction of trade and are hence left
out of the economy. The second focuses on ideas stemming from organization
theory, where FDI are studied with endogenous ￿rm organizations and general
equilibrium models of industrial structures.5
From an empirical analysis perspective, there are also two mainstream paths
to consider. The ￿rst concerns the determinants of FDI and can be derived either
from a speci￿c model or created in an ad hoc manner,6 and the second concerns
the consequences of FDI on the economic environment.7
Another bifurcation in the empirical literature occurs in the source choice of
FDI where researchers either use plant-level panel microdata, when available,
or they use FDI ￿ ows from the Balance of Payments (BoP). The former data is
better, since measurement errors are smaller, though it is lacking in international
availability. This forces us to turn to the latter, namely, BoP data which carries
larger measurement errors but is more readily available. Since the question to
be addressed here is whether the European currency union has had an e⁄ect on
FDI ￿ ows, a panel data approach is used. We utilize a coherent dataset of BoP
FDI ￿ ows from Eurostat that covers 18 countries for the years 1992-2001.8
5Grossman and Helpman (2002 a, b), Puga and Tre￿er (2002).
6See Braunerhjelm and Ekholm (1998), Chakrabarti (2001) and Markusen (2002).
7See Keller 2001 for an overview.
8The 2001 data is complete and revised, while data for 2002 is preliminary and far from
complete at this point of time. Inclusion of existing 2002 data does not in anyway alter any
conclusions in this paper.
53 Data
Eurostat provides satisfactory data for bilateral and unilateral FDI, at least
for the eighteen reporting economies. Total FDI ￿ ows are divided into three
general subcategories, namely: Equity, Other Capital and Reinvested Earnings,
with the third part su⁄ering in availability due to mis-reporting. Hence in this
paper the FDI ￿ ows refer to Equity and Other Capital. All FDI ￿ ows are net
￿ ows, where net does not imply a net between a country pair (FDIij ￿ FDIji)
but implies rather, net of disinvestment.
Following the trade literature, these kind of regressions are usually conducted
on bilateral data, but in order to increase the observations to two for each coun-
try pair in the empirical speci￿cation one-way FDI ￿ ows will be used, de￿ned
as inward FDI ￿ows, where an investment in country i from country j is rep-
resented as FDIij and is viewed an inward FDI from country i0s perspective.
The investigation in this paper entails a panel of 18 OECD countries, hence
(18 ￿ 17) = 306 country pairs, with yearly data spanning the period 1992-2001.
However, country i0s inward FDI can of course, be measured in two di⁄erent
ways. That is, either the recipient country, i, reports an in￿ ow from country j
or if investing country, j, reports an out￿ ow to country i. In an ideal world the
above di⁄erence would be redundant, but since there is a di⁄erence in reported
values, even at aggregate world level, between in￿ ows and out￿ ows and there
are no indications that one is "better" reported than the other, it is prudent to
try and ameliorate any e⁄ects stemming from this di⁄erence.
Two attempts to correct this measurement error are made in this paper, or
at least see what results ￿ dominate￿ . Firstly, if the ￿ true￿value of FDI ￿ ows lie
somewhere between country i0s reported in￿ ows and country j0s reported out-
￿ ows, it is possible to improve the estimation by taking an average of the two
creating the series called Average. Moreover, in order not to lose the majority of
the observations, since in￿ ows and out￿ ows have di⁄erent missing values, it has
to be done stepwise by ￿rstly approximating missing data on in￿ ows by their
out￿ ow counterpart, if available.9 This approximation is done by dividing the
sample into three major entities, Europe, USA, Japan, calculating an average
asymmetry between these and correcting each missing points by their average
asymmetry. The new variables that are created are In￿ows Corr and Out￿ows
9See Appendix I for methodological issues on asymmetries.
6Corr. The results obtained from these "corrected" series mirror the ones ob-
tained from the raw data series which allows us to move on to the second step
and take an average of the two new series, hence creating a new variable called
Average Corr. In the second approach we use out￿ ows (in￿ ows) to instrument
for in￿ owsij (out￿ ows), which will give us consistent estimates even if measure-
ment errors are present. The drawback of instrumenting is as usual the loss of
e¢ ciency in the estimations.
Another issue with the data is caused by the erratic nature of FDI ￿ ows
between any country pair, where many ￿ ows can be, and are, negative due
to disinvestment. The negative values in the dependent variable precludes a
conversion of the data set into a logarithmic scale. However, it is still possible to
obtain elasticities for the point estimates, since the predicted means are positive
values, by using the chain rule. This enables us to obtain a clear picture of the
magnitude of the e⁄ect due to the currency introduction. The main results will
then contain two panels, with the ￿rst depicting the raw results and the second,
below, depicting the elasticities of the predicted means.
4 Empirical Speci￿cation
The introduction of the Euro can be viewed as a sharp change in the economic
environment of the a⁄ected countries. This change makes it appropriate for
us to use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences strategy. The idea behind this estimation
strategy is to assess the e⁄ect of the introduction of the euro on inward FDI for
the euro-countries, while keeping the e⁄ects for all other time-invariant variables,
as well as common and country speci￿c time-varying e⁄ects constant, whether
these are observables or unobservables.10 A general speci￿cation of this model
can be expressed as:
FDIij;t = ￿ij + ￿t + ￿0Xij;t + ￿EMUij;t + "ij;t
where the dependent variable is FDIij;t in millions of current US dollars. On
the right hand side the explanatory variables include dummies to control for un-
observable e⁄ects, speci￿cally a country pair e⁄ect that is ￿xed over time (￿ij),
in order to control for time-invariant unobservables, and a time e⁄ect that is
10See Angrist and Krueger (1999).
7common to all countries (￿t), in order to control for time-speci￿c unobservables.
The set of explanatory variables (Xij;t) is comprised by a constant and a subset
of variables that have been found, in one way or another, signi￿cant in explaining
FDI ￿ ows in prior empirical investigations. These variables include measures of
market size for each country Yit and Yjt that are represented by GDP in current
millions of US dollars. The set includes a measure of capital- or ￿nancing ability
for country j measured as country j￿ s stockmarket value of listed companies,
Stockjt and, in hope to capture potential forward looking elements, a measure
of payo⁄ for investing in country i that is measured as the percentage change in
country i￿ s stockmarket value of listed companies, ￿Stockit is included. More-
over, since the dependent variable is "one-way" FDI, a real exchange rate index
is needed for country i and j, denoted REXit and REXjt.11 Finally, we have
our variables of interest (EMUij;t), with the acompaning vector of estimates
(￿) that capture the e⁄ect of the euro for the euro-countries. The (EMUij;t)
are interacted dummies by membership and time, where the interaction term
is zero in the absence of the intervention i.e. prior to the introduction of the
euro in 1999 or in the case of non-membership. There are three such interacted
dummy variables of primary interest here: one for inward FDI ￿ ows between
euro countries (EMU11), one for inward FDI ￿ ows to euro countries from non-
euro countries (EMU12) and one for inward FDI ￿ ows from euro countries to
non-euro countries (EMU21) and where the point estimates of these variables
represent the average e⁄ect of the euro introduction.12
Our speci￿cation also includes dummy variables that capture the EU￿ s com-
mon market e⁄ect are included as well, both for EU12 (EU12in, EU12out) as
well as for Austria, Sweden and Finland (ASFin, ASFout). Where the EU12
dummy is zero in 1992 and one thereafter, while the ASF dummy takes the
value one after 1995. Hence the full model to be estimated is:
FDIij;t = ￿ij + ￿t + ￿0 + ￿1Yi;t + ￿2Yj;t + ￿3Stockj;t + ￿4￿Stocki;t + ￿5REXi;t +
￿5REXj;t + ￿8EMU11ij;t + ￿9EMU12ij;t + ￿10EMU21ij;t +
￿11EU12inij;t + ￿12EU12outij;t + ￿13ASFinij;t + ￿14ASFoutij;t + "ij;t
11Explanatory variables such as openness and trade barriers, are super￿uous due to the
sample in this paper. See Chakrabarti (2001) for an overview and an EBA analysis on the
FDI determinants.
12A more precise description of the variables used in the regressions, sources and construc-
tion, can be found in Appendix II.
8Lastly we come to the speci￿cation issue of controlling for common unobserv-
able time e⁄ects. The most ￿ exible speci￿cation, albeit not always e¢ cient, is
yearly dummy variables. However, in order to increase e¢ ciency but maintain
maximum ￿ exibility we can restrict our regression by imposing a parametric
speci￿cation in the form of spline function, which is a kinked time trend, to
control for common unobservable time e⁄ects. We will see that inward FDI for
our groups of interest as well as our control group has very similar time evolu-
tion at an aggregate level. This leads us to believe that common time e⁄ects
can be captured by a spline speci￿cation and thereby increase the e¢ ciency
of our regressions.13 This takes us to a speci￿cation strategy, spawned from
the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach, of ￿xed e⁄ects OLS with common time
controls.
5 Results
Before we enter the world of regressions, it is of natural interest to see if there are
any indications of euro e⁄ect in the raw data. The sample of 18 OECD countries
is divided into four categories: 1) inward FDI ￿ ows between euro countries
(EMU 11) , 2) inward FDI ￿ ows to euro countries from non-euro countries (EMU
12), 3) inward FDI ￿ ows to non-euro countries from euro countries (EMU 21)
and 4) inward FDI ￿ ows between non-euro countries (EMU 22).
In Figure 1, where the Aver Corr series is used to measure FDI ￿ows in
millions of US dollars, we see that all categories evolve almost at the same
rate until 1999, when inward FDI drops for non-euro countries, but continues
upward for the rest.14 It is clear from Figure 1 that the development of inward
FDI, for all the groups, follows a non-linear development over time. Actually,
a simple ￿tted exponential trendline is able to explain 50-90 percent of the
di⁄erent groups, while a linear trend line has consistently 10 to 20 percent
lower explanatory power. Figures 2 and 3 show the relative development of our
groups of interest (EMU 11, EMU 12 and EMU 21) in terms of our control group
(EMU 22) for di⁄erent time periods. It is clear that the three euro-categories
13See Greene Ch. 8.
14This increase is irrespective of the exchange rate measure, FDI ￿ows in euro exhibit the
same pattern, hence the dollar ￿uctuation of the examined period is irrelevant. The same is
true when it comes to the empirical estimations, where the results are extremely similar for
both dollar as well as euro estimations.
9exhibit a sharp increase around 1998-1999. Also, the spike exhibited in Figure
2, for 1996, is not due to any large increase in the three groups of interest but
rather due to large disinvestment in countries that belong in group EMU 22.
More precisely it is due to US disinvestment in Sweden and the UK and due to
Japanese disinvestment in the USA.15
Figure 1: Inward FDI by Group. Millions of US $.
15Figures for absolute and relative development for the other measures of inward FDI can
be found in Appendix II.
10Figure 2: Relative Development of EMU-area groups.
Figure 3: Relative Development of EMU-area groups.
These ￿gures demonstrate two important facts. Firstly, the development
of inward FDI for the di⁄erent groups is very similar and secondly countries
belonging to the EMU area have experienced a large relative increase after the
introduction of the euro. However, even if this relative increase is clear we still
have to estimate the partial e⁄ects of various FDI determinants, including the
partial e⁄ects of the euro.
5.1 Regressions
In Table 3, the main results of this paper are presented, where inward FDI is
measured as an average between in￿ ows and out￿ ows, or where IV-estimations
are used. Columns 1, 2 and 3 deal with issues concerning common time e⁄ects,
while a comparison of columns (3), (4) and (5) attempts to shed some light into
the measurement problem that we encounter in the data. In Table 3: Panel II
the elasticities of prior regressions are depicted, adding a measure of size to the
pure direction e⁄ects of Panel I. The fact that the estimators in Panel II have
11a higher t-value than their counterparts in Panel I can be attributed to the fact
that the logarithmic form has a better "￿t".
Several interesting features emerge from the regressions in Table 3. In re-
gression (1) yearly dummies are used in order to capture common time e⁄ects
and we may note that the EMU variables are insigni￿cant. Comparing the es-
timates of the EMU variables with those obtained in regression (2), where the
EMU variables are signi￿cant, we see that the point estimates of both equations
are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. This leads us to believe that even if regression
(1) is the most ￿ exible in its de￿nition, it is not the most e¢ cient. From the ￿g-
ures presented above we may easily ￿t common time trends to the development
of FDI. We can thereby increase the e¢ ciency in our estimations by impos-
ing a functional form on our regression. This is done in equation (3), where
two splines are introduced as a mean to cope with common time e⁄ects. Our
￿rst spline comes from Figure 1 and is a simple quadratic exponential function
which, as mentioned earlier, explains ￿fty to ninety percent of the variables in
Figure 1. The second spline comes from Figure 2 and 3 and is linear until 1999
and increasing thereafter, in order to control for any common structural breaks
around that period. Since the point estimates of regression (3) are not signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent from those of regression (1), we can conclude that by controlling
for common time e⁄ects in an e¢ cient, albeit restricted, manner the e⁄ects of
the EMU on inward FDI become more pronounced.16
Moving on with a comparison of regressions (3), (4) and (5) in Table 3,
we can note that equations (4) and (5) are not really helpful when it comes
to correcting potential measurement errors. The instrumented variables take
on entirely the attributes of the instruments. That is, IV-in￿ ows (IV-out￿ ows)
look, in terms of signi￿cance and magnitude, very much like the regressions using
out￿ ows (in￿ ows) directly.17 Since no gain in consistency is apparent from the
IV-estimations,18 the end result is only loss of e¢ ciency that comes from using
instruments. On the other hand we see that regression (3) seems to inherit the
signi￿cant attributes from both in￿ ows as well as out￿ ows. This leads us, in
light of prior arguments, to believe that regression (3) is to be preferred both
for both measurement as well as estimation method issues.19
16In addition, both splines tend to be signi￿cant as a rule, even if not reported.
17We can compare the output of the IV-regressions with the regressions in Appendix III.
18Hausman tests reject the use of instruments in this case. The null of no di⁄erence in
estimates is accepted with ￿2 values of 0:92 and 0:68.
19See Appendix III for the regression results of in￿ows and out￿ows.
12Table 3: panel I
Dependent variable: Inward FDI, millions US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aver Corr Aver Corr Aver Corr IV-In￿ ows IV-Out￿ ows
Yi 0:005￿￿￿ 0:005￿￿￿ 0:005￿￿￿ 0:004￿￿￿ 0:003￿￿￿
(4:29) (4:56) (4:39) (4:30) (3:21)
Yj ￿0:002￿￿ ￿0:002￿￿ ￿0:002￿￿ ￿0:003￿ 0:001
(2:19) (2:45) (2:16) (1:83) (1:07)
Stockj 0:0004￿￿￿ 0:001￿￿￿ 0:001￿￿￿ 0:001￿￿ 0:0003￿￿
(2:61) (3:09) (2:71) (2:09) (2:07)
￿Stocki 0:25 2:14 0:07 ￿0:21 ￿0:86
(0:14) (1:32) (0:04) (0:17) (0:30)
REXi 23:6 13:7 14:5 10:7 ￿4:31
(1:20) (0:70) (0:73) (0:55) (0:25)
REXj 76:3￿￿ 63:5￿￿ 65:6￿￿ 42:0 54:1￿￿
(2:29) (2:09) (2:13) (1:35) (2:04)
EMU 11 1288:9 1597:7￿￿￿ 1755:9￿￿￿ 1192:4￿￿￿ 1352:5￿￿￿
(1:56) (4:25) (3:7) (3:08) (2:81)
EMU 12 656:3 1088:2￿ 1238:1￿￿ 861:2 1113:5￿￿
(0:71) (1:95) (2:03) (1:15) (2:05)
EMU21 1022:4 1417:8￿￿￿ 1588:2￿￿￿ 1192:7￿￿ 1420:2￿￿
(1:14) (2:88) (2:61) (2:35) (2:27)
EU12in ￿834:7￿ ￿537:0 ￿668:5￿ ￿473:4 ￿729:5￿￿￿
(1:78) (1:61) (1:91) (0:65) (2:59)
EU12out ￿100:7 182:5 45:6 ￿257:1 2571:0
(0:11) (0:21) (0:05) (0:47) (1:12)
ASFin ￿491:4 ￿403:5 ￿600:7￿￿ ￿675:2 ￿685:3￿￿￿
(1:60) (1:39) (1:96) (1:42) (2:78)
ASFout ￿435:6￿ ￿307:6￿ ￿544:2 ￿254:8 ￿538:3￿￿￿
(1:90) (1:85) (2:78) (1:47) (3:11)
Obs: 2722 2722 2722 2201 2113
R2 0:36 0:35 0:35 0:30 0:39
Year E⁄ects Dummies No Splines Splines Splines
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects not reported.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
13Table 3: panel II
Elasticities d(lny)=d(lnx) at the mean. Fitted values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aver Corr Aver Corr Aver Corr IV-In￿ ows IV-Out￿ ows
Yi 5:02￿￿￿ 5:40￿￿￿ 5:26￿￿￿ 3:14￿￿￿ 2:53￿￿￿
(4:52) (4:92) (4:69) (4:54) (3:33)
Yj ￿2:31￿￿ ￿2:69￿￿￿ ￿2:54￿￿ ￿2:18￿ ￿0:89
(2:29) (2:58) (2:25) (1:89) (1:09)
Stockj 0:41￿￿￿ 0:55￿￿￿ 0:50￿￿￿ 0:39￿￿ 0:25￿￿
(2:62) (3:17) (2:77) (2:15) (2:10)
￿Stocki 0:003 0:03 0:001 ￿0:002 ￿0:01
(0:14) (1:31) (0:04) (0:17) (0:30)
REXi 1:95 1:13 1:20 0:69 ￿0:31
(1:19) (0:69) (0:73) (0:55) (0:25)
REXj 6:31￿￿ 5:25￿￿ 5:43￿￿ 2:74 3:84￿￿
(2:45) (2:22) (2:26) (1:40) (2:10)
EMU 11 0:12 0:14￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:10￿￿￿ 0:12￿￿￿
(1:57) (4:85) (3:75) (3:30) (2:92)
EMU 12 0:05 0:08￿￿ 0:09￿￿ 0:04 0:08￿￿
(0:71) (2:05) (2:13) (1:19) (2:11)
EMU21 0:08 0:10￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:08￿￿ 0:07￿￿
(1:14) (3:02) (2:70) (2:45) (2:29)
EU12in ￿0:09￿ ￿0:06￿ ￿0:07￿￿ ￿0:02 0:08￿￿￿
(1:85) (1:66) (1:98) (0:66) (2:69)
EU12out ￿0:01 0:02 0:005 ￿0:03 0:10
(0:11) (0:21) (0:05) (0:47) (1:12)
ASFin ￿0:01 ￿0:01 ￿0:02￿￿ ￿0:01 ￿0:02￿￿￿
(1:62) (1:39) (1:99) (1:44) (2:83)
ASFout ￿0:04￿￿ ￿0:03￿ ￿0:05￿￿￿ ￿0:02 ￿0:04￿￿￿
(1:98) (1:91) (2:99) (1:52) (3:31)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects not reported.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
Concentrating on regression (3) we see that, by far, the most important
determinant both in magnitude and signi￿cance is the variable for market size
14Yi.20 This is not a surprising result, since both at an empirical as well as a
theoretical level the variable of market size is considered the determinant for
FDI.21 What is a surprising feature in the regression though, is that the measure
for the investing country￿ s market size, Yj, is negative and signi￿cant. This
occurs due to the inclusion of the measure for capital- or ￿nancing ability for
the investing country, Stockj. Controlling for the investing country￿ s ￿nancing
ability implies that Yj is to be interpreted in a relative and not as an absolute
measure, indicating that larger countries make relatively less FDI. This result
has an intuitive appeal since large domestic economies give, by default, domestic
companies a large home market, while companies from small economies need to
invest abroad in order to gain access to a large market.22
Another interesting feature are the dummy variables for the creation of the
European common market in the regression. From Panel 2 we can see that FDI
to the EU12 countries from non EU countries drops by around 7 percent and
by 2 percent for Austria, Finland and Sweden. It can be assumed that the
creation of the EU made some investment non-pro￿table due to the removal of
trade barriers, since a similar investment somewhere in the EU could service
the entire market.23
The most interesting result though, and the aim of this paper, is the impact
of the euro on FDI. The table above shows that inward FDI for the intra- EMU
area (EMU 11) increases by 17 percent approximately. The increase is certainly
not trivial and surpasses in magnitude the increase in trade volume found by
Micco et al. (2003) as well as Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003). As the ￿ndings con-
cerning trade, regression (3) shows that there are evidence concerning positive
spillovers of the EMU to their partners, represented by EMU12 and EMU21.24
The magnitudes of EMU 12 and EMU 21 are also non-trivial with an increase
of the former by 9 percent and the latter by 12 percent.
After trying to address issues of measurement and time e⁄ects, the results
20The investing countries real exchange rate is of equal magnitude but it is not signi￿cant
across the measurment spectrum of inward FDI and since it is not a variable of primary
interest in this paper, we do not dwell on it.
21See Chakrabarti (2001).
22This is conditional on exporting being less pro￿table.
23These results can be put in conjunction with some results obtained by Flam and Nord-
str￿m (2003) where dummies for the creation of the EU tend to have a positive e⁄ect on
exports from non-EU countries to EU countries.
24When out￿ows or out￿ows corr. are used as a measure EMU12 becomes insigni￿cant,
while for the in￿ows series all EMU variables become signi￿cant.
15indicate that we can be fairly con￿dent of the positive e⁄ects the creation of the
EMU had on inward FDI. These positive e⁄ects are not only within the desig-
nated EMU area but also a⁄ects its partners. The results suggest that positive
spillovers exist and that they are going in both directions. The remainder of
the paper will use regression (3) as a base reference and if any of the other
measurements of inward FDI have an e⁄ect on the results it will be duly noted.
6 Robustness Check
In this section the robustness of the obtained results is checked to changes in
country and time sample.25 Firstly it is of great importance to see if the results
truly capture a euro e⁄ect or if it is something else. As mentioned earlier,
the euro can a⁄ect international investment through several channels. Some of
these channels can have a long transmission period and not have a direct impact,
while other e⁄ects could be anticipated in advance. By changing the date of
the euro creation dummy and running our regression again, we can observe the
signi￿cance of the dummy variables. If we truly capture a euro e⁄ect, we should
observe a jump around the formal creation in 1999.26 The baseline regression
for this exercise is regression (3) in Table 3, where the dependent variable is as
always inward FDI, represented by the Average Corr series and the full model
is used to estimate the e⁄ects. The results displayed in Table 5 are the post
estimation elasticities of the EMU variables.27
Firstly we can note that prior to 1998 the euro dummies have no signi￿cant
impact. From Table 4 above we see that EMU 11 and EMU 21 show e⁄ects
starting in 1998, while this is not true for inward FDI from non-EMU countries.
This can be seen as an indication of either superior information concerning the
EMU e⁄ects for member countries, or as expressing a sense of "euphoria" for
the member states. The information concerning the EMU in 1998 was about its
launch one year ahead, while in 1999 the member states exchange rate was locked
to the euro. In addition we can note that the EMU￿ s e⁄ects on trade volume has
25For space considerations only the results of the EMU variables will be presented in the
tables. On a general basis the remaining explanatory variables sustain their signi￿cance
throughout the robustness check.
26Micco et al. (2003), Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003) ￿nd that for trade, the euro has been
anticipated and positive results start to show in 1998.
27The results are robust in terms of dependent variable choice.
16exhibited a similar pattern. In all equations, the explanatory variables retain
their signi￿cance.
Table 4: EMU e⁄ect over time, changing starting date.
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
EMU starting date:
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
EMU 11 ￿0:01 ￿0:05 ￿0:05 ￿0:03 0:02 0:11￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿
(0:15) (0:86) (0:73) (0:54) (0:48) (2:87) (3:75)
EMU 12 0:10 0:002 ￿0:03 ￿0:03 ￿0:01 0:04 0:09￿￿
(0:86) (0:03) (0:45) (0:54) (0:12) (1:08) (2:13)
EMU 21 ￿0:04 ￿0:06 ￿0:04 ￿0:01 0:03 0:08￿ 0:11￿￿￿
(0:29) (0:82) (0:59) (0:20) (0:50) (1:94) (2:70)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
The time aspect of the robustness check also requires a shortening of the
time period prior to the EMU in order to check that the estimated e⁄ects are
not obtained due to any sample selection bias.
Table 5: Time sensitivity
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Sample starting at:
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
EMU 11 0:16￿￿￿ 0:18￿￿￿ 0:18￿￿￿ 0:18￿￿￿ 0:18￿￿￿
(3:75) (4:15) (4:04) (3:83) (3:47)
EMU 12 0:09￿￿ 0:09￿￿ 0:09￿￿ 0:09￿￿ 0:08￿
(2:13) (2:23) (2:16) (2:12) (1:75)
EMU 21 0:11￿￿￿ 0:12￿￿￿ 0:13￿￿￿ 0:13￿￿￿ 0:14￿￿￿
(2:70) (2:89) (2:84) (2:87) (2:76)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
Table 5 presents the elasticities of the EMU variables obtained from the
17regressions where the pre-euro time period is shortened and we see that the
results are stable in terms of signi￿cance, with a slight in￿ ation when the pre-
EMU period is shortened.
Continuing the sensitivity analysis, we now check whether the EMU results
are driven by any particular country/countries, or whether they are more wide-
spread.28 Countries are excluded both as receivers of investment and investors
(i and j respectively). As in Table 4 and 5 the results presented in the table
are the post estimation elasticities of the EMU variables.
Table 6: Country sensitivity, single country exclusion
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Independent variables
EMU 11 EMU 12 EMU 21
Country dropped
None 0:16￿￿￿ (3:75) 0:09￿￿ (2:13) 0:11￿￿￿ (2:70)
Austria 0:16￿￿￿ (3:94) 0:09￿￿ (2:24) 0:12￿￿￿ (2:92)
Belgium-Luxembourg 0:07￿￿ (2:03) 0:05 (1:16) 0:08￿ (1:85)
Finland 0:17￿￿￿ (4:07) 0:09￿￿ (2:28) 0:12￿￿￿ (2:95)
France 0:13￿￿￿ (2:85) 0:10￿￿ (1:98) 0:09￿ (1:87)
Germany 0:10￿￿￿ (2:95) 0:06 (1:47) 0:10￿￿ (2:06)
Greece 0:16￿￿￿ (3:79) 0:08￿￿ (2:05) 0:11￿￿￿ (2:57)
Ireland 0:15￿￿￿ (3:72) 0:09￿￿ (2:15) 0:12￿￿￿ (2:81)
Italy 0:18￿￿￿ (4:19) 0:10￿￿ (2:37) 0:13￿￿￿ (3:06)
Netherlands 0:14￿￿￿ (3:09) 0:10￿￿ (2:06) 0:11￿￿ (2:31)
Portugal 0:16￿￿￿ (4:02) 0:09￿￿ (2:28) 0:13￿￿￿ (3:04)
Spain 0:16￿￿￿ (3:70) 0:09￿￿ (2:19) 0:12￿￿￿ (2:87)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
We see clearly from Table 6 that the exclusion of Belgium-Luxembourg
(BeLux) or Germany weakens the results. Further examination reveals that
when both countries are excluded simultaneously the regressions cease to ex-
hibit any euro e⁄ects, which is perhaps not so surprising since we have removed
28The methodology of this experiment follows Micco et al. (2003), Table 6 and 7.
18the most central locations in the euro area.29 Continuing however with this
investigation we notice an important feature, to wit, that if BeLux and Ger-
many are excluded only as receivers (country i), or only as investors (country
j) results showing a positive e⁄ect for the euro introduction remain signi￿cant.
These results are of importance for two reasons. Firstly, the aim of this paper
is to investigate uni-directional FDI, hence the importance of examining the
exclusion of FDI ￿ ows in only one direction, and secondly these results clearly
illuminate the fact that Belgium-Luxembourg and Germany act as a hub for
the EMU-area inward FDI but they are not the sole driving receivers of FDI
nor are they the sole driving investors. Table 7 presents the elasticities of some
chosen regressions that clarify the point made above.
Table 7: Excluding Germany and BeLux
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Excluded as country: (i) and (j) (i) (j)
EMU 11 0:04 0:07￿￿ 0:10￿￿￿
(1:26) (2:09) (2:80)
EMU 12 ￿0:01 0:01 0:10￿
(0:20) (0:37) (1:88)
EMU 21 0:05 0:13￿￿ 0:06
(0:98) (2:31) (1:43)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
Table 7 above gives some sense of what is happening in the data. Firstly, in
all cases the intra-EMU (EMU 11) values decrease when Germany and BeLux
are excluded either as receivers or as investors. Secondly, they seem to be
a driving force of both attracting FDI from non-EMU countries, as well as
investing outside the euro area, since EMU 12 and EMU 21 become in turn
insigni￿cant.30 Hence what can be said about Germany and BeLux is that while
29When the measure of inward FDI is out￿ows and out￿ows corr. the results for EMU 11
borderline insigni￿cant and have a magnitude of about 5 percent.
30The slight in￿ation of the estimate EMU 12 (EMU 21) when Germany and Belux are
excluded as country i (j), is due to a di⁄erent relative importance of the remaining EMU
countries.
19they play a vital role in the euro-area for inward FDI (EMU 11) as well as for
the spillovers (EMU 12 and EMU 21) they do not explain the entire story. The
fact that intra-EMU e⁄ects retain their signi￿cance when Germany and BeLux
are excluded either as receivers of FDI or as investors validates the question of
whether the positive e⁄ects of the euro in attracting FDI are widespread across
the members or if the e⁄ects are more concentrated. This is a topic which will
be further investigated in the next section.31
7 On the Economic Geography of the Euro
In this Section groups of countries will be excluded as receivers (country i) of
FDI or investors (country j) in order to check for any potential concentration
of inward FDI. The obtained results will be compared to similar regressions
on unilateral trade, measuring exports, where Exportij denotes exports from
country i to country j.32 The purpose here is twofold. Firstly, it will give an
indication of whether the introduction of the euro has induced any agglomer-
ation e⁄ects on economic activity. Agglomeration tendencies, or lack thereof,
are possibly important as objects of policy importance for any future EMU-
members. Moreover, the direction of trade in conjunction with the direction of
FDI might be able to reveal something of the character of FDI, that is if the
directions correspond to the notion of vertical or horizontal FDI, and where we
can keep in mind that a signi￿cant percentage of world trade, about 30 to 40
percent, is intra￿rm trade.33 Secondly, this section can also be seen as being a
continuation of the robustness check performed previously.
In the new trade literature the focus has been put on the geographic distri-
bution of economic activity, where models display both forces of agglomeration
as well as forces of dispersion. One key e⁄ect to agglomeration is the "market
access e⁄ect". It states that ￿rms tend to locate their production in the big
market and export to small markets.34
31As we have seen the magnitude varies of course, but the question is whether all members
have had some e⁄ect of varying degree or if all e⁄ects are concentrated to some countries.
32The dataset on exports is from the paper by Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003). The datasets
in this part of the paper are compressed in order to obtain the same observations in time and
space, for both exports and inward FDI.
33See, Markusen 2002, Ch.1 pp. 5-6.
34See Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Nicoud (2003).
20As mentioned above, the "new economic geography" models feature forces
of both agglomeration as well as forces of dispersion. Their relative strengths
are determined by trade costs. Mostly these models show how lower trade
costs may lead to increased agglomeration of economic production. However,
agglomeration forces are, as a rule, hump shaped in their relation to trade costs
and depending on the starting point dispersion forces may dominate when trade
￿ feeness￿is increased.35 The introduction of the euro has had a signi￿cantly
positive e⁄ect on trade volumes and it can be seen as a step of reducing such
trade costs. Yet, since we are not quite sure about our position on the hump
prior to the euro we can not make any a priori assumptions about agglomeration
e⁄ects.
Moving on to the empirical considerations we can notice that in order to
compare our results from exports and inward FDI, the datasets have to cover
the same time period and country sample.36 The division of the sample into
"big" and "small" economies is based on market size. The "big" sample of euro
countries contains Germany, France, Italy and Spain, while the remaining coun-
tries are found in the "small" sample. The baseline regressions for this exercise
are: for inward FDI, regression (3) in Table 3 and for Exports, regression (6)
in Table 4, in Flam￿ s and Nordstr￿m￿ s (2003) paper. The regressions are run
by excluding the "big" or "small" group ￿rstly as country i, i.e. as receivers
of FDI and as Exporters (Table 8.1) and subsequently as country j, i.e. as in-
vestors and as receivers of exports (Table 8.2). Moreover, since we only exclude
countries as (i) in Table 8.1, we can disregard EMU 21 for both FDI as well
as exports. The same holds for EMU 12 in Table 8.2 where the exclusion is
only countries as (j). The changes in EMU 21 and EMU 12 respectively will
be due to changes in relative importance of the remaining data. They are quite
cumbersome to interpret yet do not add anything to the analysis. The com-
parison of the obtained elasticities are in the case of exports straightforward,
where we can compare the group elasticities with their full sample counterparts
and be able to discern some pattern in the direction of trade. In the case of
the FDI regressions it is not so straightforward, since the elasticities obtained
are calculated using the chain rule and are applied to the predicted mean of the
respective regression. This mean is represented in millions of dollars and varies
when the sample is changed. In order to ease the understanding of the results
35See Baldwin et al. (2003).
36Exports for years other than 1992-2001 are dropped as well as FDI concerning Greece.
Lastly, the euro dummies have 1999 as their starting date.
21the predicted means for each FDI regression (^ y) are presented in the Tables 8.1
and 8.2.
Table 8.1: EMU elasticities of inward FDI and Exports, country (i)
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Receivers of FDI






EMU 11 0:16￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:06￿￿ 0:17￿￿
(3:75) (3:46) (2:68) (2:14) (3:43)
EMU 12 0:09￿￿ 0:07￿￿ 0:05 0:01 0:08￿
(2:13) (2:03) (1:17) (0:56) (1:66)








EMU 11 0:14￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:13￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:12￿￿￿
(6:14) (5:50) (4:97) (4:51) (3:59)
EMU 12 0:07￿￿￿ 0:06￿￿ 0:09￿￿￿ 0:06￿￿ 0:07￿￿
(3:29) (2:51) (4:20) (2:11) (2:32)
Notes: Robust jtj -values in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
a Excluding Germany, France, Italy and Spain
b Excluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, Netherlands and BeLux
c Excluding Germany, France, Italy, Spain and BeLux
dExcluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, BeLux, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark and Switzerland
Starting with the ￿rst three columns in Table 8.1 it is not clear, at ￿rst
glance, when comparing the estimates in regressions (1), (2) and (3) that "big"
countries receive more FDI ￿ ows. Both subsamples experience a seemingly
equiproportional increase in the EMU 11 variable and the "small" sample seems
to drive the results for EMU 12 . However this is not entirely true. A comparison
of the predicted average inward FDI, (^ y), and the elasticities in regressions (1),
(2) and (3) indicate that the "big" sample receives a larger share of the intra-
EMU FDI than the "small" sample, after having controled for a host of factors
22including marketsize. Moreover, the results for the "small" sample are to a large
extent driven by BeLux, which is a large receiver and sender of FDI. Separate
￿gures for the two countries can be found for the year 2002 from Eurostat. These
￿gures show that the share of Luxembourg, in the combined BeLux ￿gures, is
89 percent of the in￿ ows and 93 percent of the out￿ ows from and to the EU15.
A possible explanation for this occurence is that Luxembourg acts as a tax
haven for investment. Furthermore, if these ￿gures for 2002 are representative
for BeLux￿FDI ￿ ows in earlier years we can conclude that BeLux is far from a
￿ typical￿"small" economy and therefore exclude it from the sample. Regression
(4) shows the results when BeLux is removed from the "small" sample. The
results then become very clear insofar that inward FDI is highly concentrated in
"big" countries. Even if "small" EMU countries experience a signi￿cant increase
in intra-EMU FDI, the increase for the "big" economies is much larger and Wald
tests con￿rm that the elasticities of EMU 11 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent between
regressions (3) and (4). Moreover, we can see that BeLux solely drives the
results for EMU 12. Lastly, from regression (5), that includes only FDI between
large countries, we see that the elasticity for EMU 11 is even larger than prior
regressions. This indicates that a large part of the inward FDI increase due to
the EMU is concentrated to a few large economies.
The results concerning exports in Table 8.1 di⁄er markedly from their FDI
counterparts. Firstly, we see that regressions (2) and (4) are virtually identical
for exports, which implies that BeLux does not drive any results when exports
are concerned. Secondly, for the intra- EMU area (EMU 11) the estimates
in￿ ate, compared to the base regression, when the "big" sample is dropped as
exporter, but de￿ ate when the "small" sample is dropped. Hence, the export
increase is larger for the "small" countries. For EMU 12 the opposite holds and
the increase is dominated by the big countries exports to non-EMU members.
Turning our attention to the opposite side of this equation, namely where
do the FDI come from and to whom do the countries export to, several patterns
begin to emerge. In Table 8.2 we see again the pivotal role of BeLux for the re-
sults of the "small" sample. When, BeLux is excluded from the "small" sample,
regression (4), it is clear that the "big" economies are the ones that spawn most
of the FDI, both within the EMU-area (EMU 11) as well as outside the same
(EMU 21). The estimates of EMU 11 are again signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each
other in regressions (3) and (4) for inward FDI. The regressions dealing with
23the export side of this experiment show an equal clear tendency where a clear
increase occurs when "small" countries are dropped as receivers of exports, and
conversely a clear decrease occurs when "big" countries are dropped. Hence the
receivers of export are clearly dominated by "big" countries, both for EMU 11
as well as EMU 21.
Table 8.2: EMU elasticities of inward FDI and Exports, country (j)
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Source of FDI






EMU 11 0:16￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:10￿￿￿ 0:04￿ 0:07￿
(3:75) (2:67) (3:45) (1:86) (1:94)
EMU 21 0:11￿￿￿ 0:06 0:08￿￿ 0:01 0:04
(2:70) (1:55) (2:37) (0:41) (0:84)








EMU 11 0:14￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:21￿￿￿ 0:09￿￿￿ 0:17￿￿￿
(6:14) (3:89) (8:97) (3:07) (5:13)
EMU 21 0:08￿￿￿ 0:04 0:13￿￿￿ 0:03 0:10￿￿￿
(3:63) (1:62) (5:85) (0:91) (3:07)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
a Excluding Germany, France, Italy and Spain
b Excluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, Netherlands and BeLux
c Excluding Germany, France, Italy, Spain and BeLux
d Excluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, BeLux, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark and Switzerland
Overall, the results from Tables 8.1 and 8.2 indicate that, excluding BeLux,
FDI ￿ ows do indeed concentrate into the "big" economies. However, within
the EMU area the FDI originate also mostly from the same countries. Exports
on the other hand tend to increase more for "small" countries as a rule and
24are directed towards "big" countries, with an exception of EMU exports to non
members, where the "big" members increase their exports more to "big" non
members.
So, are there any agglomeration tendencies apparent from this exercise? The
answer to this is: only partially. Partially yes, since "big" economies attract a
larger share of the total increase in inward FDI, after controling for a host of
factors including market size. Hence we observe an increase in the concentra-
tion of production and the sample displays agglomeration tendencies. However,
exports tend to increase slightly more for small countries, which may indicate
an increase in production and, in terms of economic geography, increased dis-
persion.
While there are no clear agglomeration tendencies of economic activity, in
some cases there is similarity in the direction of FDI and exports which is
consistent with the notion of vertically integrated FDI. This creates the suspicion
that perhaps intra￿rm trade and vertical FDI increase in importance with the
introduction of the euro. This suspicion is supported by ￿ndings from Flam and
Nordstr￿m (2003) where they use regressions on one-digit SITC sector exports
and ￿nd that export increases are concentrated on di⁄erentiated and processed
input goods. Flam and Nordstr￿m note that the estimated increase for trade
can be explained by increasing vertical specialization along the lines suggested
by Yi (2003).
8 Conclusions
Several theoretical arguments exist on why the introduction of the euro should
increase international investment. In this paper a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence and
a ￿xed e⁄ects with e¢ cient common time controls approach has been used in
order to gauge the e⁄ects of the euro introduction on inward FDI for the EMU
members. After attempting to correct potential measurement problems and
various time e⁄ects in the data we estimate that the introduction of the euro has
increased inward FDI by 17 percent within the euro area. Moreover, the euro
has had signi￿cant positive spillover e⁄ects on inward FDI both to and from the
euro area by 9 and 11 percent respectively. The results are robust to changes in
time and country sample with one exception. If the central locations of Germany
25and Belgium-Luxembourg are excluded simultaneously as both receivers of FDI
and investors most of the euro e⁄ects disappear. However, if they are excluded
either as receivers or investors the euro e⁄ects reappear, which indicates that
the two countries act as a hub for FDI ￿ ows in the euro area. Finally, an
investigation of the economic geography of the euro was conducted by combining
the inward FDI results with results obtained from regressions on exports, for
the same countries and years, and examining direction patterns for "big" and
"small" economies. At a ￿rst glance the increase in FDI seems to be equally
divided between "big" and "small" countries. When excluding BeLux though,
indications of partial agglomeration forces appear in the results. Excluding
BeLux an overwhelming majority of the increase in FDI is attracted to "big"
economies. Moreover, in some cases FDI and exports follow the same direction
pattern, which indicates an increase of vertical specialization in the sample.
The fact that the results show that the increase of FDI seem to locate,
excluding BeLux, in the "big" economies in conjunction with the results indi-
cating that export of input goods are increasingly directed from "small" to "big"
economies raises several stepwise questions of relevance for future research. The
￿rst step is directed to the question of whether "small" economies are increas-
ingly acting as suppliers of input goods to multinational enterprises that, in
turn, are increasingly located in "big" economies? If this is the case, a second
natural step is to investigate whether "small" economies are going to encounter
a more volatile future in their production when exogenous shocks hit the EMU
area due to this vertical specialization and the implied supplier status. More-
over, the question arises of whether such a development will impede further on
the possibilities of "small" economies to pursue independent policies?
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27APPENDIX I: Data description
Variable Measurement Description Source
Inward FDI ij Equity + Other Capital, net Eurostat,
In￿ows Inward FDI for country i reported as New Cronos 2003
an in￿ ow for country i.
Millions current US $
Out￿ows Inward FDI for country i reported as
an out￿ ow for country j.
Millions current US $
Average Inward FDI for country i measured as
the average of above variables.
Corrections Extension of inward FDI dataset by
correcting for missing values, when
possible, for in￿ ows (out￿ ows) by
using their out￿ ow (in￿ ow) counterpart
corrected by an average asymmetry.
REX i or j Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate IMF,
Index, CPI Based IFS 2003
Y i or j GDP, Millions current US $
Stock Market capitalization of listed companies World Bank,
share price ￿ no. of shares outstanding WDI 2003
Millions current US $
Dummy Variables Description
EMU 0 prior to the introduction of the Euro in 1999, 1 afterwards if
EMU 11 both countries i and j belong to the EMU.
EMU 12 country i belongs to the EMU and country j does not.
EMU 21 country j belongs to the EMU and country i does not.
EU 12 0 prior to 1993 and 1 afterwards if
EU 12 in country i belongs to EU 12 and country j is non EU
EU 12 out country j belongs to EU 12 and country i is non EU
Austria Sweden Finland 0 prior to 1995 and 1 afterwards if
ASF in country i belongs to ASF and country j is non EU
ASF out country j belongs to ASF and country i is non EU
28Countries in the sample
￿ Group 1, EMU members: Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
￿ Group 2, non-EMU members: Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, USA.
Average asymmetries
Average asymmetries are used to calculate corrected series. For each year
there is a di⁄erence for reported aggregate in￿ ows and out￿ ows for a certain
area. This aggregate di⁄erence is used to correct missing data on
in￿ ows(out￿ ows) between two countries for a certain year, if their
out￿ ow(in￿ ow) counterpart exists.
29APPENDIX II: FDI development
As mentioned in the paper, some results may vary depending on the measure
used for inward FDI. The ￿rst two diagrams show the development of the
same variable but with di⁄erent exchange rates, while the other diagrams can
be used to compare the absolute or relative development of the di⁄erent FDI
groups depending on measure. The last diagram shows the proportion of world
or OECD total FDI that is used in this paper.
30313233APPENDIX III: Measurement regressions
Table A: panel I
Dependent variable: Inward FDI, millions US
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
In￿ ows In￿ ows C Out￿ ows Out￿ ows C Average Average C
Yi 0:005￿￿￿ 0:005￿￿￿ 0:006￿￿￿ 0:005￿￿￿ 0:006￿￿￿ 0:005￿￿￿
(3:21) (3:85) (4:30) (4:32) (3:61) (4:39)
Yj ￿0:001 ￿0:002￿ -0:005￿ ￿0:002￿ ￿0:004￿ ￿0:002￿￿
(1:07) (1:85) (1:83) (1:94) (1:72) (2:16)
Stockj 0:0005￿￿ 0:001￿￿￿ 0:001￿￿ 0:001￿￿ 0:001￿￿ 0:001￿￿￿
(2:07) (2:77) (2:09) (2:13) (2:13) (2:71)
￿Stocki ￿1:30 0:34 ￿0:33 0:20 ￿2:89 0:07
(0:30) (0:16) (0:17) (0:11) (0:57) (0:04)
REXi ￿6:49 8:14 16:88 20:86 ￿9:50 14:49
(0:25) (0:44) (0:55) (0:83) (0:25) (0:73)
REXj 81:56￿￿ 75:34￿￿ 66:58 55:94 89:9￿ 65:64￿￿
(2:04) (2:21) (1:35) (1:47) (1:75) (2:13)
EMU 11 2039:6￿￿￿ 1791:9￿￿￿ 1889:2￿￿￿ 1720:0￿￿￿ 2270:7￿￿￿ 1755:9￿￿￿
(2:81) (3:04) (3:08) (3:25) (2:76) (3:47)
EMU 12 1679:2￿￿ 1591:5￿￿ 1364:3 885:3 2265:3￿￿ 1238:1￿￿
(2:05) (2:20) (1:15) (1:15) (2:08) (2:03)
EMU21 2141:7￿￿ 1337:7￿ 1889:7￿￿ 1838:6￿￿ 2770:5￿￿ 1588:2￿￿￿
(2:27) (1:91) (2:35) (2:54) (2:46) (2:61)
EU12in ￿1100:1￿￿￿ ￿894:7￿￿ ￿749:9 ￿442:3 ￿1979:6 ￿688:5￿
(2:59) (2:45) (0:65) (1:05) (1:63) (1:91)
EU12out 3877:2 199:5 ￿407:3 ￿108:3 1230:3 45:6
(1:12) (0:21) (0:47) (0:13) (0:40) (0:05)
ASFin ￿1033:5￿￿￿ ￿872:1￿￿￿ ￿1069:7 ￿329:4 ￿1810:6￿￿ ￿600:7￿￿
(2:78) (2:63) (1:42) (0:92) (2:11) (1:96)
ASFout ￿811:7￿￿￿ ￿564:2￿￿￿ ￿403:7 ￿524:1￿￿ ￿708:4￿￿ ￿544:2￿￿￿
(3:11) (2:65) (1:47) (2:46) (2:20) (2:78)
Obs: 2113 2722 2201 2722 1555 2722
R2 0:39 0:35 0:30 0:29 0:39 0:35
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects not reported. Common time e⁄ects: Splines
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
34Table A: panel II
Elasticities d(lny)=d(lnx) at the mean. Fitted values
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
In￿ ows In￿ ows C Out￿ ows Out￿ ows C Average Average Corr
Yi 3:66￿￿￿ 5:28￿￿￿ 6:00￿￿￿ 5:25￿￿￿ 4:69￿￿￿ 5:26￿￿￿
(3:36) (4:13) (4:57) (4:59) (3:84) (4:69)
Yj ￿1:29 ￿2:38￿ ￿4:16￿ ￿2:70￿￿ ￿3:33￿ ￿2:54￿￿
(1:10) (1:92) (1:94) (2:03) (1:80) (2:25)
Stockj 0:36￿￿ 0:50￿￿￿ 0:75￿￿ 0:49￿￿ 0:68￿￿ 0:50￿￿￿
(2:11) (2:84) (2:18) (2:14) (2:22) (2:77)
￿Stocki ￿0:01 0:004 ￿0:003 ￿0:03 ￿0:02 0:001
(0:30) (0:16) (0:17) (0:11) (0:58) (0:04)
REXi ￿0:45 0:65 1:31 1:79 ￿0:58 ￿1:20
(0:25) (0:44) (0:54) (0:82) (0:25) (0:73)
REXj 5:56￿￿ 6:01￿￿ 5:22 4:81 5:50￿ 5:43￿￿
(2:13) (2:32) (1:45) (1:57) (1:87) (2:26)
EMU 11 0:18￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:19￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:20￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿
(2:95) (3:18) (3:44) (3:61) (2:89) (3:75)
EMU 12 0:12￿￿ 0:11￿￿ 0:07 0:06 0:11￿￿ 0:09￿￿
(2:13) (2:29) (1:22) (1:21) (2:20) (2:13)
EMU21 0:10￿￿ 0:09￿ 0:15￿￿ 0:14￿￿￿ 0:14￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿
(2:29) (1:92) (2:51) (2:72) (2:49) (2:70)
EU12in ￿0:12￿￿￿ ￿0:09￿￿ ￿0:04 ￿0:05 ￿0:10￿ ￿0:07￿￿
(2:71) (2:55) (0:67) (1:09) (1:69) (1:98)
EU12out 0:15 0:02 ￿0:05 ￿0:01 0:05 0:004
(1:11) (0:21) (0:47) (0:13) (0:40) (0:05)
ASFin ￿0:03￿￿￿ ￿0:02￿￿￿ ￿0:02 ￿0:01 ￿0:03￿￿ ￿0:02￿￿
(2:83) (2:65) (1:46) (0:94) (2:17) (1:99)
ASFout ￿0:06￿￿￿ ￿0:05￿￿￿ ￿0:04 ￿0:05￿￿￿ ￿0:06￿￿ ￿0:05￿￿￿
(2:38) (2:82) (1:56) (2:68) (2:34) (2:99)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects not reported. Time e⁄ects: Splines
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 % respectively.
Table A makes us enables us to discern di⁄erences in the way measurement of
inward FDI a⁄ect the results. One di⁄erence is that the use of in￿ ows gives
consistently about a 10 percent increase in explanatory power. Another is that
the signi￿cance of various explanatory variables di⁄er between the
35measurements. Moreover, very little seems to change in regressions (2) when
the raw data are expanded. Concerning the measurement of the averages we
can note that they seem to inherit the signi￿cance of the explanatory variables
for both measurements, a result that was a happy surprise for once. All
regressions use splines in order to control for common time e⁄ects.
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